Finance and cash

What should I count as overhead, and how much should I budget for it?

Two questions are hiding inside this one, and the first is the one that does the damage. Most founders of boutique professional services firms cannot say cleanly what belongs in overhead, what belongs in the cost of delivering the work, and what belongs in sales. That is not carelessness. It is the predictable result of buying finance from generalists who did not understand the business either. Until the line is drawn correctly, any percentage you set is a number about a category you have not defined. Collective 54 draws it in a specific place, and the placement carries a design rule with it: in a healthy firm, full-time employees are billable, and the functions that are not billable are kept deliberately small and bought rather than built. Once that is settled, the budget question mostly answers itself.

Founders ask Collective 54 this 9 times in our records. It is asked as a budgeting question, and the half that causes the damage is the definition.

Draw the line before you set the number

Boutique professional services firms are structurally different from product companies. The economics are built on expertise, judgment and delivery rather than manufacturing, inventory or scale efficiencies. Revenue is created by people doing billable work. Anything that does not directly contribute to selling or delivering that work is, by definition, overhead.

That definition is simple to state and routinely misapplied, because two categories sit close to it and get confused with it. Collective 54 names the confusion directly: most founders were never taught how the economics of their own firms work, and one of the specific gaps is being unclear about what belongs in overhead as against sales and marketing.

The structure we use runs in four blocks. Revenue, less the cost of delivering the work, gives gross margin. Gross margin funds overhead, which covers operations, marketing, finance, IT, legal and HR. What remains funds sales, which covers sales management, account executives, account management and client retention. What is left after all of that is EBITDA.

Two placements in that sequence are worth pausing on, because they are where most firms differ from us.

Marketing sits in overhead. Not in sales, and not in cost of delivery. Marketing in a boutique is the strategic work of point of view, positioning, value proposition, narrative and ideal client definition. It is real and it matters, but it is not the execution layer of growth and it should not be sized as though it were.

Sales is its own block, and it is not administrative cost. Winning and keeping clients is not overhead in this model. Treating it as overhead invites a firm to cut it in a bad quarter, which is the most expensive economy available to a professional services business.

The design rule that comes with the definition

The reason the definition matters is that it carries an instruction. In a healthy boutique professional services firm, full-time employees should be billable. Overhead should be kept intentionally lean. And non-billable functions should be fractionalized and outsourced wherever possible.

The most disciplined firms apply this to four core functions at once. Finance, IT, HR and legal are all treated the same way: essential, but not internal. The volume of work does not justify the headcount. The complexity does not warrant the cost. And the opportunity cost of diverting dollars away from billable talent or growth is too high. Founders who internalize these functions early usually reach the same conclusion later, more expensively.

Marketing belongs on that list too, and the position we take on it is harder than the one most firms expect. Never hire a full-time marketing leader. Never build an internal marketing team. Not at five million dollars of revenue and not at fifty. The belief that a firm eventually grows into a CMO and a marketing department is imported from product companies, and it does not transfer. When you build an internal marketing team, you create pressure to feed it, and the team produces output to justify its existence whether or not that output creates advantage. The firm pays for motion.

At launch the rule is simplest of all: you do not need the overhead functions. Outsource all of it.

What that means for the number

Collective 54 does not publish an overhead percentage, and a founder who wants one is usually trying to solve the wrong problem. A percentage is only meaningful if everyone agrees what sits inside the category, which is the definition problem again.

What we do publish is the surrounding benchmark set for a firm that intends to be sellable: gross margins above 75 percent and EBITDA margins of 40 percent, alongside revenue growth above 30 percent, twelve months of forward visibility, a year of payroll in cash and no debt.

Read as arithmetic rather than as a published overhead target, those two figures box the answer in. A firm running at 75 percent gross margin and 40 percent EBITDA has roughly 35 points of revenue to cover overhead and sales combined. That is the budget, and it is a joint budget rather than a standalone one. Every point spent on an internal function that could have been fractionalized is a point not available to the sales block, and the sales block is the one that compounds.

The newer Collective 54 material tightens this further. An AI-enabled firm can operate at materially higher EBITDA than a tech-enabled one, and as that ceiling rises the room between gross margin and EBITDA narrows. A firm targeting the higher ceiling is not simply making more money on the same cost base. It is running a smaller overhead and sales load against the same gross margin.

Why the percentage question misleads

There is a second reason to be careful with a target percentage, which is that founders who ask for one are usually operating without any external reference point at all.

The pattern we see is consistent. Founders believe that being paid in 45 days is acceptable, not knowing that peers are paid in advance and running negative working capital. They believe their compensation bands are market-aligned when they are overpaying. They believe a two-week close is efficient when it should take 24 hours. They believe a 50 percent gross margin is strong when best-in-class firms operate far above it, and that a 25 percent EBITDA margin is impressive when it is leaving money on the table.

Without benchmarks, every decision is made in a vacuum. Finance can report what happened but cannot say whether it was good, bad or fixable. An overhead percentage produced inside that vacuum tells you nothing, because you have no way to know whether the base you are measuring against is itself correct.

The part of the firm you can fix unilaterally

There is an argument for treating overhead as the first thing you modernize rather than the last, and it is a practical one.

Transforming how a firm sells and delivers requires client adoption. It involves market behavior, buyer psychology and forces the firm does not control, so progress is nonlinear and slow. Transforming internal operations is different. It is fully controllable. No client permission is required and no market education is needed. The firm can redesign these functions unilaterally and immediately.

Yet overhead is usually left until last, on the reasoning that it is back office work to stabilize once growth is solved. The result is a recognizable failure pattern: firms building Era 3 capability externally while continuing to run Era 1 finance, HR and IT internally. Growth looks healthy on the surface and leaks value underneath, and nobody can explain why the firm feels harder to run than it should.

When this answer flips

If you operate in a heavily regulated niche, some of what we would fractionalize may have to be internal. Compliance obligations that carry personal liability, or that require someone on the premises, are not a fractionalization decision. Take the cost knowingly and keep the rest lean.

If one of these functions is your actual differentiator, it is not overhead. A firm whose proprietary technology is the reason clients buy is not running an IT overhead function, it is running a product. Classify it where it earns.

And at the top of the band, with real volume behind a function, an internal hire can pencil out. The test is not firm size in dollars. It is whether the internal version buys something the fractional version cannot, and whether you would still make the hire if the same money were offered to a billable role instead.

The short answer

Overhead is everything that does not directly contribute to selling or delivering the work. Place it precisely: revenue less the cost of delivery gives gross margin, gross margin funds overhead covering operations, marketing, finance, IT, legal and HR, what remains funds the sales block of sales management, account executives, account management and retention, and what survives that is EBITDA. Note the two placements founders usually get wrong: marketing is overhead, and sales is not. Then apply the design rule that comes with the definition, which is that full-time employees should be billable and non-billable functions should be fractionalized and outsourced, including marketing, where the position is to never hire a full-time marketing leader and never build an internal marketing team at any point in the five to fifty million dollar band. On the budget, we publish no overhead percentage, but the published benchmarks of 75 percent gross margin and 40 percent EBITDA leave roughly 35 points of revenue for overhead and sales together, and the higher EBITDA ceiling available to AI-enabled firms narrows that further. Treat it as a joint budget with sales, and remember that overhead is the part of the firm you can redesign without asking a single client for permission.

Related questions

Questions founders ask next

What exactly counts as overhead in a boutique firm?

Anything that does not directly contribute to selling or delivering the work. Collective 54 places it in a specific sequence: revenue less the cost of delivering the work gives gross margin, gross margin funds overhead covering operations, marketing, finance, IT, legal and HR, what remains funds the sales block of sales management, account executives, account management and client retention, and what is left is EBITDA. Two placements catch founders out. Marketing sits in overhead, because in a boutique it is strategic work rather than the execution layer of growth. And sales is its own block rather than administrative cost, which matters because firms that classify sales as overhead cut it in bad quarters.

How much should we budget for overhead?

Collective 54 publishes no overhead percentage, and the number would mean little without agreement on what sits inside the category. What is published is the surrounding benchmark set for a sellable firm: gross margins above 75 percent and EBITDA margins of 40 percent, with revenue growth above 30 percent, twelve months of forward visibility, a year of payroll in cash and no debt. Read as arithmetic rather than as a target, those two figures leave roughly 35 points of revenue to cover overhead and sales together. It is a joint budget, and every point spent on a function you could have fractionalized is a point unavailable to sales.

Should any of these functions be internal?

By default, no. In a healthy boutique firm full-time employees should be billable, overhead should be intentionally lean, and non-billable functions should be fractionalized and outsourced wherever possible. The most disciplined firms treat finance, IT, HR and legal the same way: essential, but not internal. Marketing belongs on that list too, and the position there is firm: never hire a full-time marketing leader and never build an internal marketing team, at five million dollars of revenue or at fifty. Internal marketing teams create pressure to produce output that justifies their existence, and the firm ends up paying for motion rather than advantage.

Why do founders get this wrong so consistently?

Because most were never taught how the economics of their own firms work, and because they have no external reference point. The pattern is familiar: believing that payment in 45 days is acceptable when peers are paid in advance, that a two-week close is efficient when it should take 24 hours, that a 50 percent gross margin is strong when best-in-class firms run far above it, and that a 25 percent EBITDA margin is impressive when it leaves money on the table. Without benchmarks, finance can report what happened but cannot say whether it was good, bad or fixable, and an overhead percentage set inside that vacuum measures against a base that may itself be wrong.

Sources: Greg Alexander, The AI-Native Boutique Firm (Advantage Books, January 2027), specifically The AI Finance Manager for the position that anything not directly contributing to selling or delivering the work is overhead by definition, for the rule that full-time employees in a healthy boutique firm should be billable and non-billable functions fractionalized and outsourced, for the treatment of finance, IT, HR and legal as four core overhead functions that disciplined firms outsource, for the finding that founders are unclear about what belongs in overhead as against sales and marketing, for the benchmarking blindness list covering payment in 45 days against payment in advance, a two-week close against 24 hours, a 50 percent gross margin believed strong and a 25 percent EBITDA margin believed impressive, and for the observation that internal transformation is fully controllable while external transformation requires client adoption, together with the failure pattern of Era 3 capability built externally on Era 1 finance internally; The AI HR Manager for the same overhead-by-design treatment applied to HR; and The AI Marketing Manager for marketing as overhead by design, for the instruction never to hire a full-time marketing leader or build an internal marketing team at any point between five and fifty million dollars of revenue, and for the finding that internal marketing teams create pressure to produce output that justifies their existence. Collective 54, The AI-Native Firm Map front matter, for the P and L sequence in which gross margin funds overhead covering operations, marketing, finance, IT, legal and HR, the remainder funds the sales block of sales management, account executives, account management and client retention, and what survives is EBITDA. Greg Alexander, The Boutique: How to Start, Scale, and Sell a Professional Services Firm (Advantage, 2020), chapter 9 for the position that a firm at launch does not need the overhead functions and can outsource all of them; chapter 30 for the benchmark set of greater than 30 percent top-line growth, more than 75 percent gross margins, 40 percent EBITDA margins, more than twelve months of forward visibility, a year of payroll in cash and no debt; chapter 21 for labor as the biggest expense and the instruction to organize to reduce employee-related expense. Greg Alexander, Why Some Boutique Firms Exit Cleanly and Others Never Really Do (Collective 54), for the higher EBITDA ceiling available to AI-enabled firms. Note on scope: the arithmetic leaving roughly 35 points of revenue for overhead and sales combined is derived here from the published gross margin and EBITDA benchmarks. Collective 54 publishes no overhead percentage.

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Collective 54 is the private community for founders and executives of boutique professional services firms between $5M and $50M in revenue. Members work these answers against their own numbers.

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